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ABSTRACT
Immigration has become a hot topic in West European politics. The factors
responsible for the intensification of political conflict on this issue are a
matter of considerable controversy. This holds in particular for the role of
socio-economic factors and of radical right populist parties. This article
explores the politicization of immigration issues and its driving forces in the
electoral arena. It is based on a comparative study using both media and
manifesto data covering six West European countries (Austria, France,
Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK) for a period from the early
1990s until 2017. We find no association between socio-economic factors and
levels of politicization. Political conflict over immigration follows a political
logic and must be attributed to parties and party competition rather than to
‘objective pressures.’ More specifically, we provide evidence that the issue
entrepreneurship of radical right populist parties plays a crucial role in
explaining variation in the politicization of immigration.
KEYWORDS Europe; immigration; politicization; party manifestos; political parties
Introduction: who is politicizing immigration in Western
Europe?
In the last decade, European countries have witnessed a new wave of immi-
gration which has been nurtured from diverse sources, among them labour
market-driven migration within the European Union (EU) after Eastern enlar-
gement and refugees and asylum seekers from politically unstable and econ-
omically less developed regions in Africa and Asia. Likewise, public attention
of immigration issues has increased in Western Europe and political conflict
has intensified both at the domestic and the European level (Messina 2007;
Van der Brug et al. 2015). At the European level, existing legal obligations
and commitments, for example in the field of asylum policy, have caused con-
troversies among member states and have met with domestic resistance.
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Within EU member states, immigration has become a ‘hot topic’ (Green-Ped-
ersen and Otjes 2017). Conflicts over immigration have become salient in
national elections; they played a major role in some national referenda
(most consequentially in the ‘Brexit’ campaign); and they have had a signifi-
cant impact on the political agendas of governments.
Conventional explanations of the politicization of immigration in Western
Europe hold that it is the combined result of two factors: a significant increase
of immigration in recent years, which is overstraining the capacities of national
states to control their borders and to accommodate and integrate new
migrants, on the one hand; and the successful exploitation of these challenges
by radical right populist parties, on the other hand. The decisive role of these
parties in the emergence of new political conflicts on issues such as immigra-
tion and European integration has been emphasized by several strands of
research, among them (neo-)cleavage theory (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kriesi
et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008), post-functionalist integration theory (Hooghe
and Marks 2009) and the theory of issue entrepreneurship (Hobolt and de
Vries 2015). These theories argue that the new issues are most successfully
mobilized by ‘populist, non-governing parties’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 21),
radical right populist parties using nationalist-identitarian frames in particular.
Such arguments find only limited support in the literature on the politiciza-
tion of immigration, however. While there is conclusive evidence of an
increasing salience of immigration issues since the 1990s (Green-Pedersen
and Otjes 2017; Van der Brug et al. 2015), we find remarkable disagreement
on the driving forces of politicization. The most comprehensive study on
this topic by Van der Brug et al. (2015) attributes increasing salience of immi-
gration issues neither to socio-economic factors nor to the mobilizing force of
radical right challenger parties. They conclude that ‘politicisation is very much
a top-down process, in which government parties play an especially impor-
tant role’ (Van der Brug et al. 2015: 195). This is in line with work by Bale
(2008), Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) and Meyer and Rosenberger
(2015) who argue that mainstream center-right parties are the main drivers
of the politicization of immigration issues in Europe.
Evidently, despite a rapidly expanding literature on the politics of immigra-
tion, our understanding of the main factors responsible for politicizing immi-
gration issues in Western Europe is still unsatisfactory. This is partly due to a
narrow focus of previous research on specific aspects of politicization, either
on the positioning of parties on immigration issues or on their salience. More-
over,most studies rely on a single data source (media data ormanifesto data) to
analyze partisan conflicts over immigration assuming that each of these data
sources provides a full picture of themost relevant activities of political parties.
This article contributes to this research in two related ways. First, by using a
multi-dimensional concept of politicization which combines salience and
polarization as suggested in the recent literature on politicization (De Wilde
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2011; Hoeglinger 2016; Hutter and Grande 2014; Hutter et al. 2016; Kriesi
2016), we provide a comprehensive analysis of the development of political
conflict over immigration issues in national elections in the period from the
early 1990s until 2017. Our comparative analysis includes six West European
countries, namely Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom (UK). Second, by combining media data and mani-
festo data for the analysis of political conflict over immigration in the electoral
arena, we provide a more nuanced picture of the driving forces of the politi-
cization of immigration issues by political parties. Most importantly, our
approach allows distinguishing between strategic drivers of politicization on
the one hand, and the visibility of political parties in election debates, on
the other hand.
Which factors are actually responsible for the politicization of immigra-
tion issues in national election campaigns? Three findings of our analysis
deserve mention. First, politicization of immigration is not correlated with
socio-economic factors such as the annual change in the number of immi-
grants entering a country or the level of unemployment. Political parties
enjoy substantial strategic leeway in responding to immigration challenges
in election campaigns. Second, our analysis of manifesto data confirms that
radical right populist parties are issue entrepreneurs which strategically
drive the politicization of immigration issues. This is not to say that the stra-
tegic efforts of challenger parties to emphasize the immigration issue in
their manifestos necessarily results in high visibility of these parties in
public election campaigns. Our analysis of campaign debates suggests
that both radical challenger parties and mainstream parties can dominate
these debates.
Theoretical framework and hypotheses
The politics of immigration include a broad range of topics including public
attention to immigration issues, the positioning of political parties towards
these issues and political protest and violence, to mention only some of the
most important ones. The dependent variable of our analysis is the level of
politicization of immigration issues in national election campaigns. Our con-
ceptualization of politicization emphasizes political conflict, the ‘scope of
conflict’ more specifically (Schattschneider 1975 [1960]: 16). Our analysis
investigates situations of intense political conflict on immigration issues
among political parties in the electoral arena. In line with the scholarly litera-
ture, we focus on ‘party political attention’ (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017: 2)
to immigration as previous research shows that other political actors such as
civil society groups and social movements are of secondary importance with
regard to the politicization of immigration in Western Europe (Kriesi et al.
2012). Key questions then are: What drives the politicization of immigration
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issues? How relevant are political forces as compared to other factors, such as
socio-economic variables?
In the literature on migration, socio-economic variables figure prominently.
These variables include national migration patterns, the composition of the
migrant population, models of integration and economic conditions such as
the level of unemployment or the annual rate of economic growth. The
relationship between these factors and various political aspects related to
immigration (e.g., popular attitudes towards immigrants, the strength and
electoral success of anti-immigration groups and parties, the politicization
of immigration issues in public debates and elections) have been a recurring
topic in the scholarly literature (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017; Hainmueller
and Hopkins 2014; Van der Brug et al. 2015). Arguments focusing on immigra-
tion patterns assume that politicization is a response to an increase in the
migrant population and of its composition. In this context, Green-Pedersen
and Otjes (2017) show that party political attention to immigration is posi-
tively correlated to increases in the number of foreign born in the population.
Sociological theories of realistic group conflict and the theory of ethnic com-
petition suggest that ethnic conflict intensifies if different ethnic groups find
themselves competing for key resources such as jobs and housing (Olzak
1994; Rydgren and Ruth 2011). Political parties may respond to such
conflicts by emphasizing these issues in electoral competition. Therefore,
we expect that a significant increase in the migrant population and economic
grievances resulting from rising unemployment and major economic crises
will intensify political conflict on immigration issues in electoral politics. We
formulate this expectation in our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Immigration issues in the electoral arena are highly politicized, if
immigration or unemployment rates are high.
The explanatory power of socio-economic variables has been contested in the
scholarly literature, however. In their review of research on public attitudes
towards immigration, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) find little evidence
that immigration attitudes are strongly related with personal economic cir-
cumstances. The negative consequences of economic globalization and immi-
gration are certainly distributed unequally within societies, but the resulting
threats are filtered by many factors, as shown by Ferrera and Pellegata
(2018). The comparative study by Van der Brug et al. (2015) on the politiciza-
tion of immigration issues in public debates also finds no effect of the pro-
portion of migrants on politicization but a significant negative effect of
unemployment on the salience of migration issues. In sum, the contribution
of socio-economic factors such as the share of immigrants, the composition
of the migrant population and economic grievances to the explanation of
the level of politicization in European countries remains a matter of
controversy.
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Against the background of these findings, a significant leeway for political
parties to mobilize or downplay the issue in election campaigns can be
assumed. In the following, we therefore discuss approaches, which – referring
to saliency theory of party competition (Budge and Farlie 1983; Robertson
1976) – each emphasize the importance of issue competition in elections,
but arrive at different conclusions with regard to the partisan actors who dom-
inate this competition.
The theory of issue entrepreneurship has made a specific type of party,
namely challenger parties, a focus of attention (Hobolt and de Vries 2015).
Issue entrepreneurs are defined as parties actively promoting a previously
ignored issue and adopting a position which is different from the mean pos-
ition in the party system (Hobolt and de Vries 2015: 1161). With regard to
immigration issues, it is mostly radical right populist parties which are
assumed to act as issue entrepreneurs and which are expected to be respon-
sible for the politicization of such topics in the existing literature (Hooghe and
Marks 2009; Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008; Mudde 2007). This expectation
has been confirmed by Green-Pedersen and Otjes (2017) on the basis of mani-
festo data. To test this expectation, we formulate a ‘challenger party
hypothesis’.
Hypothesis 2: Immigration issues in the electoral arena are highly politicized, if
radical right populist parties employ issue entrepreneurial strategies in their
party manifestos.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that mainstream parties were also found
to contribute to the politicization of immigration (see Van der Brug et al.
[2015]).1 Meyer and Rosenberger (2015) argue on the basis of media data
that radical right parties only play a subordinate role in the politicization of
immigration and that the contribution of mainstream parties to raising
issue salience has been underestimated. This holds for moderate right
parties in particular, as shown by Bale (2008) and Green-Pedersen and
Krogstrup (2008). For this reason, we also formulate a ‘moderate right party
hypothesis’.
Hypothesis 3: Immigration issues in the electoral arena are highly politicized, if
moderate right parties employ issue entrepreneurial strategies in their party
manifestos.
The literature on the politicization of immigration suggests that the two
hypotheses on the role of radical right populist and mainstream parties are
mutually exclusive. However, the controversies on the question which
parties are responsible for politicizing immigration issues in national election
campaigns may at least partly result from the fact that they reflect different
aspects of electoral competition. A party which drives the politicization of
immigration issues through issue entrepreneurship in its manifesto must
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not necessarily be the most visible one in the subsequent public debate. In
order to explore this aspect, we analyze the structure of public election
debates in more detail. This allows distinguishing between strategic drivers
of an issue in party competition on the one hand and the visibility of a
party in a public election debate, on the other hand.
Two competing expectations about actors dominating public election
debates on immigration issues can be derived from the literature. On the
one hand, available research suggests that parties, which strongly emphasize
an issue in their manifestos, will also play an important role in campaign
debates as covered by the mass media. Research shows that despite the
gate keeping role of the media, the issue emphasis strategies as found in
party manifestos are translated into the news coverage of political parties
(Merz 2017). Against this background, we expect that radical right populist
parties employing issue entrepreneurial strategies in their manifestos are par-
ticularly visible in the media, provided that the issue is politicized.
Hypothesis 4: Radical right populist parties are the most visible actors in highly
politicized public election debates on immigration issues.
On the other hand, the scholarly literature provides several arguments why
mainstream parties of the moderate left and moderate right can be expected
to dominate politicized debates on immigration even if they do not employ
an issue entrepreneurial strategy. Mainstream parties may decide for strategic
reasons to respond to an issue emphasized by a challenger parties either by
accommodating to its position or by taking an adversarial stance (Meguid
2005). These parties are found to be particularly sensitive to the actions of
their competitors and pick up issues that figure prominently on the party
system agenda (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015). Moreover, there is evi-
dence that mainstream parties may be forced into a debate by ‘systemic
pressures’ (Steenbergen and Scott 2004). This may result in ‘contagious
effects’ as identified by Van Spanje (2010) for anti-immigration parties. As a
result, moderate right and moderate left parties may become the most
visible actors on an issue in an election debate, even if they do not emphasize
it in their manifestos, as shown by Dolezal and Hellström (2016) for European
integration issues.
Hypothesis 5: Mainstream parties are the most visible actors in highly politicized
election debates on immigration issues.
Research design and methods
To analyze the politicization of immigration in Western Europe in national
elections, we present a comparative study of 44 national election campaigns
in six countries (Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom). Our focus is on 38 elections between the early 1990s
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until 2017, including elections after the ‘refugee crisis’. Our data includes every
parliamentary election since the early 1990s. In addition, we include one elec-
tion from the mid-1970s, which serves as a point of reference from a period
when politicization of immigration is commonly assumed as being low.2 An
overview of the elections covered in our analysis is provided in Table 1 in
the online appendix.
This data provides a broad empirical testing ground for the hypotheses laid
out above. Our sample includes those four liberal states which have been the
focus of empirical research on the policies and politics of immigration in
Europe, namely Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom. In addition, we include two West European countries in which
radical right populist parties have been particularly successful in the last
two decades, namely Austria and Switzerland. As emphasized by Kriesi
(2016), the six West European countries covered by our study are distinct
from East and South European countries with regard to the structuring of pol-
itical conflict and the importance of the new ‘demarcation-integration’ clea-
vage. For this reason, we are cautious with generalizations of our findings.
To study the politicization of immigration, we opt for data on political con-
testation during election campaigns based on two different data sources that
provide different windows of observation of party behavior in an election
campaign. We use party manifesto data to study the strategic efforts of
parties to emphasize immigration issues in an election; and we rely on quan-
titative data collected from mass media to analyze party behavior in public
election debates.
Data on public election debates is taken from projects led by Hanspeter
Kriesi and Edgar Grande (Kriesi 2016; Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008)
and available from these authors upon request. It is based on a quantitative
content analysis of newspaper articles. For each country, a quality newspaper
and a tabloid newspaper were chosen.3 Articles referring to politics were
selected and subsequently coded using the core sentence approach, a
method developed by Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings (2001). It treats ‘core sen-
tences’, which consist of a relation between a subject (party actors) and an
object (issues) as the unit of analysis. The approach allows building an issue
category on immigration which comprises all statements of party actors on
immigration and integration policies.
In line with the scholarly literature (De Wilde 2011; Hutter and Grande
2014), we conceptualize politicization as a multi-faceted process which
includes both the public visibility of conflict (i.e., its salience) and the polariz-
ation of actors on a contentious issue. Following Hutter and Grande (2014),
Hutter et al. (2016) and Hoeglinger (2016), we measure politicization of
the immigration issue in election campaigns by multiplying the salience of
the issue with its degree of polarization.4 Regarding the issue of European
integration, this literature shows that these two dimensions of politicization
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are independent and that multiplying them provides meaningful results. This
is confirmed by our own data, in which both dimensions of politicization are
uncorrelated (r =−0.03, t =−0.16), i.e., they measure different aspects of poli-
ticization.5 Both variables are measured at the systemic level (i.e., at the level of
the overall party system) and are then multiplied to arrive at an overall indi-
cator of politicization. Salience in this context refers to the visibility of the
immigration issue in relation to other issues in an election campaign. Accord-
ingly, the indicator is operationalized as the percentage share of core sen-
tences on immigration compared to the number of all observations during
an election. Polarization is measured as the positional variance between
parties on the immigration issue. We also calculate the mean of these vari-
ables over all issues covered by our data set to arrive at benchmarks that
allow distinguishing between elections with comparatively high or low
levels of politicization. To measure the visibility of party families in election
campaigns, we calculate the percentage share of core sentences for a party
family on immigration in relation to all coded observations on the issue at a
given election. Details on the operationalization of the dimensions of politici-
zation are provided in the online appendix.
Data on the strategic behavior of parties is taken from party manifestos col-
lected by the Manifesto Project (MARPOR). We adopt the concept of issue
entrepreneurial strategies as developed by Hobolt and de Vries (2015) to
analyze which parties try to politicize immigration issues strategically. An
issue entrepreneur is a party that promotes an issue and adopts a position
that deviates from the mean position in the party system (Hobolt and de
Vries 2015: 1168).
As the issue categories of the Manifesto Project do not include an issue cat-
egory for immigration (see Lehmann and Zobel [2018]: 2), we provide novel
indicators for the issue attention of parties and their positions on this topic
in party manifestos to measure the concept. For this purpose, we use the man-
ifestoR corpus which enables applying text mining approaches to the mani-
festos covered by the MARPOR project (Lehmann et al. 2017; Volkens et al.
2017). In a first step, we use country-specific keyword lists to identify sen-
tences addressing immigration issues. Based on this information, we calculate
parties’ issue attention as the percentage share of sentences on immigration
in relation to all sentences in a manifesto. In a subsequent step, we draw a
sample of 20 sentences on immigration from each manifesto to manually
code a party’s position. Here, we differentiate between supportive, neutral,
and sceptical positions and use the mean value from these codings to
arrive at a position score for each party. Positional deviance is then calculated
as the distance of a party’s position from the mean position of the party
system at the time of the election. Following Hobolt and de Vries (2015:
1169), both variables are then multiplied to get an overall measure of a
party’s entrepreneurial strategy.
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To validate this method, we use data on parties’ issue attention and pos-
itions on immigration also measured in party manifestos using a crowd-
sourced coding approach (Lehmann and Zobel 2018). As many manifestos
are covered in both studies, it is possible to use this study to validate our indi-
cators. Due to very high correlations between the indicators derived in the
two studies, we conclude that our coding approach produces valid results.
A detailed description of this approach and the validation procedure is pro-
vided in the online appendix.
Given the theoretical arguments presented above, we distinguish between
two types of parties: mainstream and challenger parties. Challenger parties are
characterized by the fact that they have not previously held political office and
occupy positions which are distinct from the mean position in the party
system (Hobolt and de Vries 2015: 251). This definition encompasses all
kinds of parties from radical left and radical right party families, as well as
green, regionalist, and single-issue parties, but it excludes minor moderate
parties. Since we are particularly interested in the role of radical right challen-
ger parties, we only include parties belonging to this party family in our analy-
sis of challenger parties. These are: the Swiss Peoples Party (SVP) (Switzerland),
the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)
(Austria), Alternative for Germany (AfD) (Germany), UK Independence Party
(UKIP) (UK), Front National (FN) (France), and Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) and
Party for Freedom (PVV) (Netherlands). The SVP and FPÖ are included in the
category of challenger parties although these parties have been in govern-
ment, thus violating the first criterion of a challenger party. However, both
parties are consistently considered as main representatives of the family of
new radical right populist parties (Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008; Mudde
2007) and certainly meet the second criterion.
Mainstream parties are defined as the electorally dominant parties from the
moderate part of the political spectrum (Meguid 2005: 348). Hence, main-
stream parties typically comprise moderate-left and moderate-right parties
that compete for government (De Vries and Hobolt 2012: 250). In line with
the coding by Meguid (2005) and others, we code in our sample the Social
Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), the British Labour Party, the French Parti
Socialist (PS), the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the Dutch
Labour Party (PvdA), and the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SP) as
belonging to the moderate left, whereas the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP),
the British Conservatives, the Union for French Democracy (UDF) and the
French Union for a Popular Movement (RPR/UMP), the German Christian
Democrats (CDU/CSU), the Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), the
Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), and the Christian
Democratic People’s Party of Switzerland (CVP) are coded as part of the mod-
erate right. Smaller liberal parties (e.g., the German Free Democratic Party
(FDP) and the British Liberal Democrats are not considered here. In line
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with Meguid (2005), we do also not include the Swiss Liberal Party (FDP) in the
category of moderate right parties. For an overview of our coding of parties
see Table 2 in the online appendix.
Finally, to explore the effect of socio-economic factors on politicization,
several indicators are available. Regarding immigration, we use the annual
share of incoming migrants in relation to the overall population of a
country from the International Migration Database provided by the Organiz-
ation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as an independent
variable.6 To study the role of grievance effects, we show the results for the
most conventional one, namely the annual unemployment rate in percent,
as provided by the Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS) (Armingeon et al.
2016). We cross-checked the validity of these indicators by calculating the
relationship between politicization and other socio-economic indicators,
and we also explored the impact of time-lags within this relationship. These
additional tests corroborate the findings presented in the empirical section
below and are shown in the online appendix.
Empirical findings
In the following, we present our empirical findings in four steps. First, we
show descriptive data on the dependent variable, namely politicization of
immigration in national elections. Second, we investigate the relationship
between politicization and socio-economic variables. Third, we analyze
the impact of the strategies of challenger parties on politicization. Fourth,
we explore the visibility of party families in campaign debates on immigra-
tion issues.
National patterns of politicization
How strong is the politicization of immigration in the national electoral arena?
How much variation is there over time and across countries? As shown in
Figure 1, immigration has become a highly politicized issue in national elec-
tions since the 1990s. We find several elections in which immigration has
been a highly politicized issue in every country, except for the UK. This
becomes apparent in comparison to the 1970s, when immigration issues
were almost invisible in the electoral arena. As shown by Kriesi et al. (2008),
immigration has become the main driver for the transformation of political
conflict in this period. Average values for the entire period are rather moder-
ate, however, and values for individual dimensions indicate that politicization
of immigration has been mainly driven by polarization.7
Figure 1 also reveals remarkable fluctuation between elections in each
country. Except for the UK, we observe striking ups and downs in the devel-
opment of politicization. This pattern is most pronounced in France where
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highly politicized elections in 1988, 2002 and 2012 were followed by moder-
ate levels of politicization in subsequent elections in 1995, 2007 and 2017.
Moreover, there is considerable variation across countries. Among the six
countries included in our sample, the UK is a clear outlier. Immigration has
been a low key issue in national elections for most of the time, but politiciza-
tion has been increasing to a moderate level since the mid-2000s not the least
due to the Conservative Party’s efforts to acquire issue ownership while in
opposition (Dennison and Goodwin 2015). The other countries witnessed pro-
nounced peaks of politicization in the 1990s, although with significant differ-
ences in timing. Elections after 2010 are often characterized by a sharp
increase in the politicization of immigration. The Dutch election in 2012 and
the German election in 2017, where we measure the highest values in our
sample, clearly stand out.
Socio-economic factors and grievances
Is the politicization of immigration issues in national elections due to ‘objec-
tive’ factors such as the number of incoming migrants and economic grie-
vances? In the left panel of Figure 2, we take the annual change in the
number of immigrants entering a country as an indicator for the size of the
‘objective pressure’ exercised by immigration and relate it to the level of poli-
ticization of immigration issues in national elections. Evidently, the two
Figure 1. The politicization of immigration in national elections per country over time.
Note: Graph shows the level of politicization of the immigration issue in national elections for each country
over time in national election campaigns as covered by the media. The black dashed lines indicate the
linear trend. The horizontal, grey dashed lines show the mean politicization calculated over all issues in
our data and serves as a benchmark to distinguish between high and low levels of politicization.
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variables are hardly correlated (r = 0.10; t = 0.58). These results are in line with
the conclusions of Van der Brug et al. (2015: 192) that no systematic relation-
ship exists between politicization of immigration and immigration-related
variables such as the number of immigrants living in a country, the number
of immigrants entering the country, or the composition of the immigrant
population. Neither is politicization driven by economic grievances. As we
can see in the right panel of Figure 2, no positive correlation exists
between the politicization of immigration and unemployment (r = 0.05; t =
−0.29). This also holds for other economic variables on which data is available
in Armingeon et al. (2016). The results of these analyses as well as a regression
model with socio-economic and issue entrepreneurship variables are shown
in the online appendix.
Taken together, these analyses contradict the hypothesis on the impor-
tance of socio-economic factors (H1). Politicization is neither correlated with
‘objective’ properties of immigration nor with economic grievances of the
native population. These findings add to the insights of studies which empha-
size the importance of political factors, and particularly political parties, for
politicizing immigration issues (see, e.g., Kitschelt [1995]; Messina [2007];
Van der Brug et al. [2015]).
The role of issue entrepreneurship of radical right challenger parties
The increase in immigration in Western Europe has been accompanied with
the surge of anti-immigration groups, in particular radical right populist
parties (Messina 2007: 54–96). The organization of this ‘nativist backlash’
and its political relevance varies considerablly among the six countries in
our sample. France and the Netherlands are characterized by the emergence
of electorally successful new radical right populist parties; in Austria and
Figure 2. Relationship between politicization and socio-economic factors.
Note: The left panel shows the level of politicization of immigration in relation to the annual share of
incoming migrants as a percentage of the total population of a country. The right panel shows the
relationship between the politicization of immigration and the unemployment rate in the country.
Black lines show the linear fit, grey areas show the confidence interval.
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Switzerland, two established moderate right parties radically changed their
programmatic profiles and adopted restrictive positions on immigration
issues in the 1990s; whereas in Germany and the UK, efforts to establish a
radical right populist party at the national level have not been successful in
most of the period covered by our study. Hence, radical right populist
parties have not been relevant in all the countries included in our sample.
Are there differences in the strategic emphasis of immigration issues
between party families in their election manifestos? And how are these strat-
egies related to the politicization of immigration issues in public election
debates?
Figure 3 shows the efforts of party families (moderate right, moderate left,
and radical right populist parties) to emphasize immigration issues in their
manifestos. Comparing issue entrepreneurship between these three groups
reveals significant differences. On average, radical right populist parties put
considerably more effort in politicizing immigration issues than other
parties (mean = 5.01; sd = 3.17). In contrast, parties of the moderate right
(mean = 1.17; sd = 1.13) and parties of the moderate left (mean = 0.72; sd =
0.99) show much lower average levels of issue entrepreneurship. The high
average value of radical right populist parties is due to higher scores on
both components of issue entrepreneurship: Radical right populist parties
put more emphasis on the issue on average (mean = 6.03) than parties of
the moderate right (mean = 3.10) and moderate left (mean = 2.08). Moreover,
they also deviate more strongly from the mean position in the party system
(mean = 0.79) than parties of the moderate right (mean = 0.36) and moderate
left (mean = 0.32). These findings provide no evidence that moderate right
parties play a prominent role as strategic drivers of immigration issues in
the electoral arena as suggested by parts of the scholarly literature (e.g.,
Bale [2008]; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup [2008]).
Figure 3. Issue entrepreneurship on immigration issues by party family.
Note: Issue entrepreneurship is measured as the product of the salience a party puts on immigration issues
and its positional deviance from the mean position in the party system based on party manifesto content.
Bars indicate the mean values for each party family. Spikes represent the 95% confidence interval.
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These results indicate that immigration issues are of greater strategic impor-
tance for radical right populist parties in election campaigns compared to other
party families. However, this does not imply that these efforts necessarily lead to
the politicization of immigration issues in public election debates. To explore the
role of radical challenger parties andmainstreamparties of themoderate left and
moderate right in this regard, Table 1 shows the results of regression analyses
which treat the level of politicization as the dependent variable and issue entre-
preneurship of party families as the main independent variables. Model 1 shows
that issue entrepreneurship of radical right populist parties is positively and stat-
istically significantly related to the level of politicization in election campaigns,
while this is not the case for mainstream parties. In the former case the increase
inpoliticization levels is, in fact, quite sizeable. Politicization ranges fromabelow-
average value of 1.8when issue entrepreneurship of radical right populist parties
is at the lower quartile to an above-average value of 3.0 when it is at the upper
quartile. This difference corresponds to 12% of the range of politicization values.
Thus, we do find evidence for our ‘challenger party hypothesis’ (H2), but not for
the ‘moderate right party hypothesis’ (H3). Politicization of immigration issues is
driven by issue entrepreneurial strategies of radical right populist parties rather
than by efforts of other party families.8
To explore this finding in more detail, we additionally check whether the
association remains significant when controlling for the vote share of
radical populist right parties. That is indeed the case as Model 2 shows. The
fact that the coefficient for the vote share of these parties is close to zero
and fails to reach statistical significance, provides further evidence that it is
not simply the presence of radical right populist parties that fuels the politici-
zation of immigration, but their strategic focus on immigration issues.9
The visibility of different party families in debates on immigration
The strategic impact of radical challenger parties on politicization must not
be equated with their visibility in public election debates. In the last step of
Table 1. Linear regression models of politicization of immigration issues in national
elections.
Model 1 Model 2
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Intercept 1.79** 0.47 1.80** 0.50
Radical right populist (RRP) 0.20* 0.07 0.21* 0.10
Moderate right 0.09 0.23 0.08 0.23
Moderate left −0.18 0.13 −0.16 0.15





Note: White’s robust standard errors clustered for countries are computed.
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our analysis, we explore the actor composition in mass mediated election
debates with above average levels of politicization on immigration. This
allows us to uncover the relative importance of party families in public elec-
tion debates. Figure 4 shows the results for the 29 elections with high
levels of politicization. Our analysis reveals that moderate mainstream
parties are the most visible actors in more than half of these elections.
Taken together mainstream parties from the moderate left and moderate
right account for more than 50 percent of all coded core sentences on
the issue in these elections. This even holds true for elections in which
mainstream parties were confronted with a strong challenger party from
the radical right as it was the case in the 2017 German election, where
more than 70 percent of all coded statements can be attributed to the
moderate left (SPD) or the moderate right (CDU/CSU). Moreover, the visi-
bility of mainstream parties is not positively related to the mobilizing
efforts of these parties as measured in their manifestos: We observe no sig-
nificant correlation between issue entrepreneurship and visibility for parties
from the moderate right (r = 0.22, t = 1.16) and the moderate left (r =−0.19,
t = 1.01). Thus, in line with Hypothesis 5, and similar to the findings
reported by Van der Brug et al. (2015), we find that mainstream parties
are very visible actors in politicized election debates on immigration,
irrespective of the campaign strategy they pursue in their manifestos.
This is not to say that challenger parties are always marginalized by main-
stream parties in these debates. In line with Hypothesis 4, Figure 4 also
shows elections in which radical right populist parties are highly visible. Most
Figure 4. Visibility of party families in politicized election debates on immigration.
Note: Stacked bars represent the relative visibility of a party family in relation to other party families in
campaign debates on immigration issues as covered by the media. The dashed horizontal line allows iden-
tifying elections where moderate mainstream parties account for more than half of all coded observations.
Only debates where the politicization of immigration is above our benchmark are reported. Bars are sorted
by the joint visibility of mainstream parties.
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evidently, this holds for Switzerland where the SVP is by far the most visible
party on immigration issues in a number of elections. The Swiss SVP is a
special case, however. As it has been in government in the entire period it is
not a typical example of a challenger party. More instructive are the French elec-
tion in 2002 and the Dutch election in 2012, which show that new non-govern-
ing challenger parties can also dominate election debates on immigration.
Moreover, in contrast to the findings for moderate mainstream parties, we
find a positive and significant relationship between issue entrepreneurship
and visibility for radical right populist parties (r = 0.58, t = 3.71). In sum, these
results provide mixed support for both hypotheses on the visibility of party
families in politicized election debates on immigration issues.
Conclusion
Our empirical analysis provides mixed support for the arguments advanced in
the scholarly literature on the politicization of immigration in Europe. Three
conclusions stand out. First, our analysis confirms earlier findings which
observe a significant increase in politicization of immigration issues since
the 1990s in Western Europe for the electoral arena (Kriesi et al. 2012;
Messina 2007; Van der Brug et al. 2015). Immigration has become a highly
controversial issue in national election contests. We found evidence for
strong politicization in every country we analyzed, but we also found remark-
able variation over time and across countries. The extreme fluctuation in the
intensity of political conflict over immigration within countries is one of the
most puzzling features of politicization of this issue. The marked peaks in
politicization and the consistently high polarization values suggest that the
potential for politicization has been huge in the entire period, but this poten-
tial has not been fully exploited in every election thus far.
Second, politicization is not correlated with socio-economic factors such
as the share of immigrants in a country or the level of unemployment.
Therefore, our first hypothesis (H1) must be rejected. It is certainly true
that the existence of some immigration has been a necessary precondition
for political mobilization, but there is no direct relationship between the
intensity of political conflict and socio-economic grievances. This is not to
say that socio-economic factors are entirely irrelevant in our context; but
they do not translate directly into manifest political conflict among political
parties in the electoral arena.
Third, previous findings on the political actors responsible for the politiciza-
tion of immigration in the electoral arena must be qualified. Our results
support arguments which claim that the issue entrepreneurship of radical
right populist challenger parties leads to higher levels of politicization. Contrary
to some scholarly expectations, we found no similar effect for moderate main-
stream parties. This is not to say that the strategic efforts of challenger parties
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to emphasize the immigration issue in theirmanifestos necessarily results in high
visibility of these parties in public election campaigns. Our analysis of campaign
debates suggests that both radical right challenger parties and mainstream
parties can dominate these debates. In public debates, high levels of politiciza-
tion of immigration issues can also result from the reactions by mainstream
parties on challenger parties. Some recent studies corroborate this mechanism.
On the one hand,mainstreamparties are found to be particularly sensitive to the
actionsofotherpartieswhen it comes to the salience theyputonan issue (Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen 2015). On the other hand, they frequently adapt their
positions in response to challenger parties and their electoral gains (Abou-Chadi
2016; Meijers 2017; Van Spanje 2010). Nevertheless, our findings invite more
research scrutinizing the behavior of mainstream parties to strategic actions of
radical right challengers and its effect on politicization.
Summing up, political conflict over immigration follows a ‘political logic’
(Messina 2007) and must be attributed to parties and party competition
rather than to ‘objective pressures’ in Western Europe. The fact that political
parties have significant room for strategic manoeuvring regarding immigra-
tion issues makes it even more important to understand what they make of
these opportunities.
Notes
1. It is also argued that mainstream parties in opposition are especially likely to
emphasise new issues (Van de Wardt 2015). We only find modest evidence for
this expectation in our data, which is presented in the online appendix.
2. In the French case, we considered the first round of the presidential elections,
because these elections are considered as being the most important national
elections. Data on the election for the 1970s is only available for the parliamentary
election in 1978. The election in 1988 is the first presidential election included in
our sample. In the Austrian case, the snap election of 1995 is not included.
3. Newspapers included are: Die Presse & Kronenzeitung (Austria); Le Monde & Le
Parisien (France); Süddeutsche Zeitung & Bild (Germany); NRC Handelsblad &
Algemeen Dagblad (Netherlands); The Times & The Sun (UK); Neue Zürcher
Zeitung & Blick (Switzerland).
4. Wedonot include ‘actor expansion’, a third dimensionof politicization (seeHutter
andGrande 2014), in our analysis because it is inherently associatedwith ourmain
explanatory variable, namely issue entrepreneurship of challenger parties.
5. The empirical analysis of Van der Brug et al. (2015: 192) also shows for immigra-
tion issues that salience and polarization are not correlated.
6. http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=MIG&lang=en# (accessed
20.06.2018). No reliable information on the number of incoming migrants for
France and for Germany in 2017 is available. Hence, these elections are excluded
from analyses on the role of socio-economic factors.
7. Details on the level of politicization as well as additional information on the two
sub-dimensions of the concept of politicization are provided in the online
appendix.
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8. The finding of a strong and significant coefficient for issue entrepreneurship of
radical right populist parties remains the same,whenwe estimate, as a robustness
test, robust standard errors or log-transform the skewed dependent variable.
When including other party families in the analysis like green parties or liberals,
we also find no significant associations for these actors, while the coefficient for
radical right populist parties is still significant. Moreover, we find no evidence
that the coefficient of issue entrepreneurship of one of our party families is con-
ditional on the behavior of others as all interaction effects between issue entre-
preneurship of different party families fail to reach statistical significance.
9. The online appendix, moreover, presents separate regression models with sal-
ience and polarization as dependent variables. It becomes evident that relation-
ships with each constituent variable of politicization differ. Therefore, we
conclude that politicization is indeed a distinct phenomenon and one cannot
expect to extend explanations of politicization to its constituent elements.
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